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BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN A
TRANSITIONAL STATE:
The Case of Thailand

David Pimentel*
Balancing judicial independence against judicial accountability is a
classic problem, but the debate has often taken place without reference
to specific legal cultures and traditions, and there is compelling reason to
believe that the “right” balance may be different in different societies. Thailand is in transition, so the models of established Western democracies may
be ill-suited to the problems and issues of the Thai judiciary. Moreover,
independence and accountability are not ends in themselves, but means
to the same end: that of fair, impartial, and effective justice. Independence can help, primarily by bolstering the “judicial courage” exercised
by judges called upon to rule in difficult cases. Accountability can help
as well, primarily by bolstering the “integrity” judges demonstrate in their
performance on the bench. In light of this, the structural solutions for the
judiciary under a new Thai constitution should be crafted in light of (1)
the history, tradition, and culture of the Thai judiciary, (2) the degree of
courage and integrity already manifested among Thai judges, and (3) those
structures and mechanisms that can leverage the Thai judges’ strengths and
ameliorate, or at least mitigate, their weaknesses. Until Thailand has a new
constitution, the courts there will be seriously handicapped in playing their
critical roles of providing fair and impartial adjudication and of protecting
human and other legal rights. When, indeed if, constitutional checks and
balances are put in place, the stage will be set for a calming of the turmoil in Thailand. But that can only happen if the judiciary is sufficiently
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empowered and independent to play that constitutional role, while showing both sufficient integrity to avoid corruption and sufficient restraint not
to overreach into the political realm. In other words, the individual judges
must exhibit both this courage and this integrity in their rulings. And the
structure of the judiciary—the mechanisms for protecting the judges (to
promote independence), and for policing them (to promote accountability)—will be important in facilitating that result, restoring public confidence in the legal and political system, and ultimately strengthening the
rule of law in the Kingdom of Thailand.
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Introduction
Judicial independence and judicial accountability have long been
viewed as in tension with each other. The assumption is that any effort
to strengthen judicial independence makes it difficult to hold judges accountable, and that any accountability initiative undermines judicial independence. Accordingly, much attention has been devoted to striking
the “right” balance between these two concepts, both of which are important, but each of which can be advanced only at the expense of the
other. The debate about how these two should be balanced, however, has
often taken place without reference to specific legal cultures and traditions, and there is compelling reason to believe that the right balance may
be different in different societies.1
Thailand is facing particular challenges at present as a transitional
state, under martial law until April 2015, and still awaiting approval of a
new constitution. The proper role and power of the judiciary in such a
state is difficult to define and even harder to implement. But a more nuanced understanding of the classic independence v. accountability debate
may help craft meaningful and effective solutions for Thailand.
The starting point is to understand that independence and accountability are not ends in themselves, but means to the same end: that of
fair, impartial, and effective justice. Independence can help, primarily by
bolstering the judicial courage exercised by judges called upon to rule
in difficult cases. Accountability can help as well, primarily by bolstering
the integrity judges demonstrate in their performance on the bench. In
light of this, the structural solutions for the judiciary under a new Thai
constitution should be crafted in light of (1) the history, tradition, and
culture of the Thai judiciary, (2) the degree of courage and integrity already manifested among Thai judges, and (3) those structures and mechanisms that can leverage the Thai judges’ strengths and ameliorate, or at
least mitigate, their weaknesses. The future of the Thai legal system, and
particularly its prospects for the rule of law, depend on a sensitive implementation of these considerations.

1. David Pimentel, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of Judges’ Courage and Integrity, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev.
1 (2009) [hereinafter Pimentel, Reframing the Debate].
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The concept of the “rule of law” was first spelled out by A.V. Dicey,
a nineteenth century constitutional theorist, who was careful to specify
that punishment for crime could come only for violating pre-existing laws
and after sentencing by regular courts, and that rights are protected by
ordinary legal processes.2 It follows that a functional court system—one
that will dispense justice according to these pre-existing laws, and following ordinary legal processes—is essential to the rule of law. Corrupt court
systems cannot deliver justice, and independence is a necessary bulwark
against such corruption and a critical precondition for the rule of law
itself.3
Put another way, if the law is to be enforced evenhandedly, if no one
is to be above the law,4 the judges must be free to act independently in
applying the law and rendering judicial decisions. If Thailand is to have
a “government of laws and not of men,”5 it needs a court system that respects law more than it respects the power of any individual(s). Thailand’s
constitutional history, dating back to 1932, demonstrates a long-standing
commitment to democratic principles, values embraced by the Thai people now for generations.6 And although the country has been through serious political upheaval in recent years, including the present struggle to
establish yet another constitution, the monarchy—with all of the moral
authority it commands in Thailand—has been a stabilizing rather than a
disruptive influence in the attempt to establish a secure and functional
democratic society. Accordingly, it is no threat to this monarchy to suggest, as Thomas Paine did, “For as in absolute governments the King is
law, so in free countries the law ought to be king.”7 Paine was speaking
at the time of the American Revolution, and his rhetoric reflects the anti-royalist sentiment of his society and his time, but the principle remains,
that if the rule of law is to prevail, there must be a supremacy of law, and
equality before it.
2. Jane Stromseth et al., Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of
Law After Military Interventions 70 (2006).
3. Samuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, 46 Judges’ Journal 16 (2007).
4. Popular definitions of the rule of law almost always include this requirement
that all be equal before the law and that no one is “above of the law.” See, e.g., Rachel
Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in Promoting the Rule of Law
Abroad: In Search of Knowledge 31, 38–39 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
5. Mass. Const. art. XXX.
6. Thailand: A Democracy at Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs Subcomm. on Asia and the Pac., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Scot Marciel,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs) (citing
Thailand’s “democratic tradition” and urging support for “efforts to move Thailand
back towards” it); Thailand Profile – Timeline, BBC (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-15641745 [https://perma.cc/GS7Z-8JAY] (In 1932, “Constitutional monarchy [was] introduced with parliamentary government”).
7.
1 Thomas Paine, The Writings of Thomas Paine (Moncure Daniel Conway
ed., 1894).
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The task falls to the judiciary, then, to ensure the fair and even-
handed application of the law. That requires a judiciary that is independent enough to resist improper influence, including pressure from the
politically powerful. It requires a judiciary that exercises its authority
according to higher principles of integrity and justice.
B.

Judicial Behavior Is the Ultimate Measure of Independence

Judicial independence is usually defined in terms of freedom from
outside influence. Judges who face pressure, or consequences, for the merits of their decisions will have difficulty deciding cases impartially—the
outside influence is deemed to have impinged upon their independence.
Accordingly, great efforts are made to neutralize those influences and to
insulate judges from any potential retaliation for their decisions. The aim
is to give the judges sufficient protection—e.g., structural provisions that
grant them job security (often life tenure), guarantees that their salaries
will not be reduced, provision of adequate security, etc.—that they can
make independent judgments without fear of consequences.
But such consequences and influences can never be eliminated
completely. No doubt a judge who makes a politically unpopular decision
will face social opprobrium at the very least. The judge may also damage
her prospects of elevation to a higher court. The judicial structure can do
only so much to minimize the exposure of judges to such consequences.
Accordingly, what is critical is not so much the structures themselves, but whether the judge can/will withstand or ignore such outside
influences. The judge needs to show judicial courage, shrugging off inappropriate influences, and making independent judgments regardless of
the consequences to her personally. Viewed from this perspective, the
“judicial independence” structure—that attempt to minimize the consequences judges may face for their unpopular decisions—is important
only to the extent it may embolden the judge to demonstrate judicial
courage. At the same time, a judicial system demonstrates the virtue of
judicial independence not in terms of the structural safeguards that exist
to protect judges, but by the behavior of the judges themselves. Judicial
independence is achieved only when the judges have developed a practice and tradition of acting independently.
C.

Judicial Independence’s Image Problem

Judicial independence is not a particularly compelling rallying cry.
The public rarely takes to the streets to protest against the lack of judicial independence. The legal community is likely to appreciate the critical
role that judicial independence plays in a functional system—the lawyers
who appear before the courts will certainly be cynical about their own
work if they perceive the judges’ decisions being influenced or controlled
by external forces, political or otherwise. There are a couple of reasons
the public is likely to frame the issue differently, however, and to feel less
sympathetic to the judicial independence cause.
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First, they may not be at all happy that judges can exercise independence to subvert the agendas of their elected leaders, which in a democracy, should be expected to reflect the will of the majority.8 It is a marginalized minority, unable to implement its agenda through the political
process, that benefits from an independent judiciary. They may demand
some independence for the courts in the hope that courts will raise barriers, or impose limits, on the political initiatives of the party in power.
While the minority’s plea for judicial independence might be rooted in
its commitment to principles of good governance, it is just as likely to be
driven by self-serving efforts to pursue its own agenda. It will almost certainly be perceived that way. The majority in turn, aggrieved by judicial
decisions that subvert its own agenda, will brand the judges as activist
judges and condemn these exercises of judicial independence.9
Second, the public is likely to interpret the term “judicial independence” to speak to the judges’ personal privileges, comforts, or amenities.
Those issues are unlikely to engender public sympathy; after all, judges
are already perceived as privileged and powerful people. But, as U.S.
District Judge John L. Kane (D. Colo) cautioned, “We must all understand that judicial independence is not for the protection of judges, but
for the protection of the public.”10 Otherwise, “judicial independence” is
likely to be viewed as a low priority, and more likely a problem in need
8. See, e.g., U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, A “Fireside Chat” Discussing
the Plan for Reorganization of the Judiciary, (Mar. 9, 1937), in 6 The Public Papers
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 122, 123–24 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1941).
Last Thursday I described the American form of Government as a three
horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that
their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of course, the three branches of government—the Congress, the Executive and the Courts. Two of the
horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not. Those who have intimated
that the President of the United States is trying to drive that team, overlook
the simple fact that the President, as Chief Executive, is himself one of the
three horses. It is the American people themselves who are in the driver’s
seat. It is the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed. It
is the American people themselves who expect the third horse to pull in
unison with the other two.
Id.; Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve
America 5 (2006) (“Critics of judicial activism frequently charge that whenever a
court strikes down a law, it effectively thwarts the will of the majority that passed
that law.”); see also Frances Kahn Zemans, Pound Revisited, 48 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1063,
1066 (2007) (regarding “President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan . . . [m]embers of
the court were attacked as activist judges who were imposing their will over the legislative and executive branches of government.”).
9. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the
Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 911, 912 (2006).
10. Judge John L. Kane, Jr, Keynote Address at the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 1997 Annual Meeting and Conference in Denver, Colorado:
Public Perceptions of Justice: Judicial Independence and Accountability (Sept. 29,
1997).
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of a remedy.11 Indeed, the public, particularly a disenfranchised public, is
likely to view judges as highly entitled and perhaps overdue for a humbling of some kind.
D.

Judicial Independence as a Means to an End

Acknowledging the potential for this misperception, some who
actively promote the independence of the judiciary have begun using
different terminology, insisting that they are working toward a judiciary
that is impartial or fair, rather than one that is independent.12 Of course,
this is not mere semantic subterfuge. Judicial independence is important
only because it is an essential precondition to the judiciary playing its
proper and meaningful role as an impartial and fair arbiter of disputes,
and protector of rights. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. And
what is the ultimate “end”? We could call it “the rule of law,” although
that hardly helps, as there is so much dispute over what it really means.
A more meaningful, and hopefully less controversial formulation would
be “fair, impartial, and effective justice.” And it is not difficult to see why
an independent judiciary—one that can’t be swayed by political pressure,
money, threats, etc.—is essential to achieve that.
E.

Independence from What/Whom?
1.

Independence from Political Influence

a. Political influence in the absence of democracy
In a society dominated by a political strong man,13 the independence of the judiciary is particularly at risk. The authoritarian leader will
11. When the Thailand Institute of Justice (TIJ) held a seminar on September 29, 2015, on Judicial Independence and Accountability, it surveyed its audience
on whether they thought the Thai judiciary needed more independence, nearly half
(49.4%) responded that they thought the judiciary already had too much independence. See Annex A; see generally, Kelly J. Varsho, In the Global Market for Justice:
Who is Paying the Highest Price for Judicial Independence?, 27 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 445,
452–53 (2007) (“[A]n independent judiciary is accountable to no one. People argue
that there can be too much judicial independence; since judges are government officials who exercise plenary power, they should be accountable to the public.”).
12. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 3 (2003) (recognizing “fairness” and “impartiality” as ideals sought as the ends of judicial independence and accountability); American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/american_judicial_system/subcommittee-on-state-courts/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/J5Z6WVF5] (last visited Jan. 30, 2008); Our Mission, Inst. for the Advancement of the
Am. Legal Sys., http://iaals.du.edu/about [https://perma.cc/8MDW-QJJB] (last visited
Jan. 30, 2008); Justice at Stake’s Mission, Justice at Stake, http://www.justiceatstake.
org/about/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
13. Some have characterized Thailand as one such society. See, e.g., Rodion Ebbighausen & Gabriel Dominguez, General Prayuth: Thailand’s New Strongman, Deutsche
Welle (May 27, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/general-prayuth-thailands-new-strongman/a-17665821 [https://perma.cc/9K6C-H4JX]; Sebastian Strangio, The Strongman of Siam, Foreign Pol’y (May 21, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/21/
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insist on being above the law, if not the law himself. It is difficult to ask, or
to expect, a judiciary to withstand such raw political power. Indeed, the
problem is likely to be far worse than simply exempting that individual
from the reach of the law. More likely the captive courts will be forced to
do the bidding of that leader—protecting his friends and political allies,
and persecuting his enemies and anyone who threatens his power.
b. Political influence from the democratically-elected majority
At the same time, even in a democracy, there must be limits on the
authority of the majority. No doubt lawmaking is entrusted to democratic majorities and their representatives in the legislatures, but minorities have rights too, rights that should be protected against majoritarian
authority. The majority won’t like it, of course, as discussed above. But it
is here that the judiciary plays a critical role, and where the need for its
independence becomes so compelling.
As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, in a democratic society, the role
of the judiciary is to protect the minority from the “tyranny of the majority,”14 lest the rights of minorities be swept aside entirely. If the courts
are the protectors of unpopular minorities, it naturally follows that the
democratic majority may disapprove of a given judicial intervention. And
the elected political branches of government, reflecting the views of the
electorate, may be unhappy with the judiciary’s imposition of limits, Constitutional or otherwise, on the majority’s ability to pursue its agenda
unchecked, i.e., its power to trample the rights of any unpopular minority.
It is inevitable that political pressure will be brought to bear against any
judiciary that is filling its proper role of protecting that minority,15 and the
judiciary must be independent enough to withstand that pressure.
2.

Independence from Crime Bosses or Other NonGovernmental Interests

But judicial independence goes beyond insulating judges from the
political process and political pressure. Judges may also be subject to
threats and pressure from litigants, including society’s criminal element.16
the-new-king-of-siam-thailand-prayuth-junta/ [https://perma.cc/3XAY-CVSR].
14. See generally 1 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 269–72,
288–89 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1957) (1835).
15. Critics lament a lack of judicial independence, and particularly a politicized judiciary, in Thailand today. See, e.g., Kevin Hewison, Judicial Politicization
as Political Conservatism, Cultural Anthropology (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.
culanth.org/fieldsights/565-judicial-politicization-as-political-conservatism [https://
perma.cc/4WXR-UNV4].
Constitutional court judges have sometimes declared their political neutrality, claiming that their interventions are intended to maintain the rule of
law, protect electoral minorities, and check the power of elected politicians.
However, their record denies this and most observers concur that the judiciary is a steadfast ally of . . . political groups. . . . There is no judicial independence in Thailand, and there will not be for the foreseeable future . . . .
Id.
16. Thailand’s judiciary appears to be vulnerable to some of these influences.
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Organized crime has, historically, been quick to recognize the value of
having judges “on their side,” and has tapped its considerable expertise
in the field of extortion and bribery to influence judges in corrupt ways.17
Otherwise honest judges have certainly been influenced by either the
generosity of the donor or by genuine fear. Judges are certainly vulnerable to threats of blackmail,18 personal violence, or any type of harm to
the judges’ loved ones.
Here the line between independence and accountability gets
blurred. If judges are “in the pocket” of the mob, the public is not likely
to view it as a problem of an insufficiently independent judiciary, but of
an insufficiently accountable judiciary. Nonetheless, it is a matter of improper influence; such attempts to influence judges will always be there.
Judges need to be independent enough to be able to resist or ignore these
manipulative forces from outside of government every bit as much as
they need to be independent of political influence.
F.

Institutional Independence v. Decisional Independence

It is also important to note the distinction between the independence enjoyed by judges in their individual decisions and the independence the judiciary as a whole enjoys from the other branches of government. The latter may be termed “institutional independence” and usually
reflects separation of powers principles. As matter of constitutional structure, it is important that judicial governance rest within the judiciary itself, minimizing legislative and executive control over court operation
and administration, including staffing and budgeting.19
Institutional independence can be threatened if other branches of
government attempt to influence the judicial system in its functioning,
and this can happen despite separation of powers structures enshrined
in the constitution. The legislature, for example, is typically responsible
for the judiciary’s budget and is certainly capable of abusing that power
either to threaten the courts with budget cuts or to micro-manage its

In 2014, seven judges were disciplined, four of which were removed from office for
“corruption.” See Veera Prateepchaikul, Judge Sackings Send Shockwaves Across the
Benches, Bangkok Post (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/426077/
[https://perma.cc/C5P5-HJD6].
17. See Abrahamson, supra note 12, at 10 (discussing how threats of physical
harm impair judicial independence); see generally Charles R. Ashman, The Finest
judges Money Can Buy, and Other Forms of Judicial Pollution (1973) (documenting the cases of dozens of corrupt judges); Robert Cooley, When Corruption was King: How I Helped the Mob Rule Chicago, then Brought the Outfit
Down (2004) (recounting the historical perspective of a mob attorney turned state’s
evidence).
18. No doubt most people have embarrassing secrets they would prefer to keep
quiet. Judges, given their positions of public trust, have even greater reason than most
to care about their reputations and the respect they can command in the community.
19. See the discussion about the composition of judicial councils infra Section
II.A.3.
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priorities and operations through earmarked funding.20 Legislatures can
also use lawmaking powers to change courts’ jurisdiction. Executive
branch authorities who may present a budget to the legislature, and who
exercise veto authority of legislative enactments, similarly wield power
over the judicial branch.21 Depending on how judicial appointments are
done—in the U.S. both the executive and the legislature play an essential
role—either of these two branches could retaliate against the judiciary by
refusing to fill vacancies on the bench, leaving the judiciary understaffed
and unable to function effectively.22
One approach to limit the legislature’s budgetary control over the
judiciary is to guarantee the judicial appropriation in the constitution
itself. Costa Rica’s constitution, for example, provides that six percent
(6%) of the annual budget is to be allocated to its judiciary, depriving
the legislature of the ability to use its power over budgets to pressure or
influence the judiciary.23 Similar provisions appear in the constitutions of
Paraguay (3%) and Venezuela (2%).24 It does not appear that any coun-

20. J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence from What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 241, 246 (2001) (“The legislature’s control over the provision of financial resources to the judiciary prevents the
judiciary from being completely independent from the rest of the government.”).
21. Indeed, until 2000, the Thailand’s Ministry of Justice had control over the
judiciary’s administration, including its budget. Inst. of Developing Econs., The Judicial System in Thailand: An Outlook for a New Century 17–19 (2001).
22. There can be little doubt that refusal to fill judicial vacancies (i.e. to confirm
the President’s nominees) has been utilized in the U.S. Senate, although the motivation usually appears to have more to do with partisan politics (frustrating the President’s efforts to put like-minded judges on the bench) than with retaliating against or
otherwise harming the judiciary. See Timothy M. Phelps, Republican Senate Accused
of ‘Slow Walking’ Obama’s Judicial Nominees, L.A. Times (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.
latimes.com/la-na-senate-judges-20151002-story.html [https://perma.cc/7HJ8-VS7N].
23. Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica [Constitution]
Nov. 7, 1949, art. 177, translated in World Constitutions Illustrated 38 (Jefri Jay
Ruchti ed., 2016) (“[N]o less than six percent of the ordinary revenues calculated for
the economic year will be allocated to the Judicial Power.”).
24. Constitución de la República del Paraguay [Constitution] June 20,
1992, art. 249, translated in World Constitutions Illustrated 59 (Jefri Jay Ruchti
ed., 2012) (“The Judicial Power enjoys budgetary autonomy. In the General Budget
of the Nation an amount will be allocate to it not inferior to three percent of the budget of the Central Administration.”); Constitución de la República Bolivariana de
Venezuela [Constitution] Dec. 20, 1999, art. 254, translated in World Constitutions
Illustrated 55–56 (Jefri Jay Ruchti ed., 2010).
The Judicial Power is autonomous, and the operating, financial and administrative autonomy of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice is hereby established.
To this end, in the national general budget a variable annual amount at least
equivalent to 2% of the ordinary national budget shall be allocated to the
justice system in order to enable it to function effectively; such amount shall
not be reduced or modified without authorization in advance from the National Assembly.
Id.
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try in Asia has adopted such an approach, although it has been advocated
for Nepal.25
Threats to the judicial branch as a whole can certainly influence individual judges in their decisions as well. Some judges may even be pressured by their own colleagues on the bench to avoid irritating the legislative and executive branches, lest the entire judiciary be made to suffer as
a result. So there is potential overlap between institutional independence
and the more personal, decisional independence of the individual judge.
However, institutional independence does not guarantee decisional
independence. If the leadership of the judiciary has a particular ideological orientation,26 judges at lower levels may feel considerable pressure to
make their decisions conform to it. Judges who hope for career advancement, including elevation to higher level judgeships, may be particularly
vulnerable to this type of influence. This has been cited as a difficulty in
Japan, where institutional independence is strong, but the decisional independence of the individual judges suffers terribly from influence coming from within the judiciary.27
But most of the focus on judicial independence is not on separation
of powers and the judicial branch’s entitlement to autonomy in the system of checks and balances. The issue, as it concerns justice and the rule
of law, is the content of the courts’ decisions, and the independence that
judges feel to render those decisions without the interference of outside
forces and influences.

II.

Importance of Judicial Accountability

The opposite side of the coin is judicial accountability. It is not
enough for judges to be independent. Freeing them from outside influence may not be enough to ensure “fair, impartial, and effective justice.”
The judge must also pursue her responsibilities with at least a minimum
degree of integrity. Indeed, judicial independence is supposed to protect
the judge from personal consequences that come from making an unpopular decision,28 thereby freeing the judge from fear, and enabling her to
rule on the merits of the case. By insulating the judge from consequences
for her decision, we free her to do the right thing without fear of reprisal.
25. David Pimentel, Constitutional Concepts for the Rule of Law: A Vision for
the Post-Monarchy Judiciary in Nepal, 9 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 283, 311 (2010)
(quoting an E-mail from Dr. Ram Krishna Timalsena, Registrar of the Supreme Court
of Nepal (June 18, 2009, 03:33 CST) (on file with author)).
26. This was an issue in Turkey until a few years ago. See discussion infra notes
78–80.
27. David M. O’Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independence from
Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy:
Critical Perspectives from around the World 37 (Peter H. Russell & David M.
O’Brien eds., 2001).
28. One might also argue that judicial independence is compromised not only
when the judge is intimidated into avoiding an unpopular outcome in the case, but
also when a judge is aware that personal benefits (promotion, etc.) inure to the judge
who secures a popular outcome in a case.
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Of course, protecting a judge from consequences for her decisions may
just as easily free her to do the wrong thing without fear of sanction.
The important value, therefore, is not so much judicial accountability as judicial integrity.29 We demand accountability because we believe
it is necessary to persuade judges to resist the temptation to engage in
corruption. Indeed, if the ultimate goal is “fair, impartial, and effective
justice,” judicial accountability is important only to the extent that it persuades judges to avoid bad behavior, or effects the removal of judges
who indulge in it. If corruption or other judicial misconduct is not a
problem, then accountability—i.e., a mechanism for disciplining errant
judges—serves little purpose. Rather than worrying about how best to
impose judicial accountability, we should focus on how best to promote
judicial integrity.
Of course, judicial accountability cannot be so easily dismissed.
Corrupt judges do exist, and there has to be some way of removing them
from the bench. Moreover, the public may need to be reassured that
there is a means of disciplining and removing judges. The specter of a
judge who is entirely untouchable, who enjoys impunity for any and all
of her judicial actions—embodying the Platonic ideal of judicial independence—would likely spark outrage from the public and undermine
confidence in the judiciary overall. Accordingly, it is not surprising that
judicial accountability, like judicial independence, has been recognized as
a bulwark of the rule of law.30
A.

Accountable to Whom?
However, creating an accountability mechanism inevitably creates a dilemma. Whoever has the power to discipline or remove judges
also has the power to influence them. The creation of accountability,
the very possibility of discipline, therefore, necessarily undermines the
judge’s independence. Judges who have reason to fear the disciplinary
authority will necessarily be reluctant to render decisions unpopular with
that authority.
1.

Administering Judicial Discipline Within the Judiciary

The question then, is who can be trusted with the power to discipline and remove judges? The easier question may be who should not be
entrusted with this authority: anyone with a political agenda. Routine judicial discipline, therefore, should probably be carried out entirely within
the judicial branch, by fellow judges who already enjoy some measure of
judicial independence. Judges may have great incentive to police their
own institution and drum “bad apples” out of the judiciary altogether.
Any corruption tolerated within the judiciary, or perception thereof,
harms everyone, as the legitimacy of the judiciary is undermined.

29. Pimentel, Reframing the Debate, supra note 1.
30. See Bufford, supra note 3.
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Because the judiciary is the non-political branch of government,
this will keep judicial discipline one step removed from political influence. Partisan agendas seem unlikely to dominate in a disciplinary regime implemented by non-partisan judges. Moreover, every judge on the
disciplinary panel is keenly aware of the importance of judicial independence—as someone who enjoys it and relies upon it—and will carry out
disciplinary proceedings with particular sensitivity to its impact on judicial independence. It is not a guarantee that judicial discipline will be
beyond the reach of politics, of course—the problems within the judiciaries of Turkey31 and Japan32 are cases in point—but it is nonetheless provised at least one layer of insulation from political influence on judges’
decisionmaking.
2.

Keeping Judicial Discipline Away from Majoritarian Politics

Of course, it is tempting to suggest that judges should be accountable to the people, to the populace that they serve. This thinking has
prompted many states in the United States to adopt systems of electing
judges by popular vote; it allows the voters to remove a judge who has
lost their confidence. The Maoists in Nepal advocated having the judiciary governed by a special committee of the parliament, a committee
of elected officials who, as members of parliament, represent the people who elected them to their seats.33 This proposal was justified on the
ground that judges should be “accountable to the people.”34
The problem with this, of course, is that it makes the judiciary accountable to majoritarian politics, and effectively undermines the ability
of the judiciary to perform its constitutional role discussed above: “to
protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority.”35 Courts need to
be able to give constitutional protection to unpopular parties, and should
not be subject to the shifting winds of politics. Putting the judiciary under
the thumb of the legislature, or even the voting public, can only politicize
the judiciary and make it difficult for judges to give due weight to the
rights of those who, due to their status as a political minority, are outside
the circles of power and influence.
Selecting judges by popular election, which looks attractive from
some perspectives—including the ease of removing a judge widely known
to be corrupt36—is a particularly problematic approach to accountability
31. See discussion infra at notes 78–80.
32. See O’Brien & Ohkoshi, supra note 27 (observing how judges in Japan suffer
from pressure to conform to the preferred ideology of the judiciary). But the judiciary
is a better place to center the disciplinary power as it is usually at least one step removed from majoritarian politics.
33. David Pimentel, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: Grappling with
Ideology and History in the New Nepali Constitution, 21 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 207,
220–21 (2011).
34. Id. at 216.
35. See discussion supra p. 7 and note 14.
36. In the United States, Judge Harry Claiborne continued to collect his salary
as a federal judge even after he was convicted of felony tax evasion and sent to prison.
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for other reasons as well. Charles Geyh documents thoroughly the problems with judicial elections in his article Why Judicial Elections Stink.37
Among his concerns are (1) the fact that public is ill-informed about judicial candidates, and (2) the fact that any attempt to run a campaign—
which might better inform the voting public—requires the unseemly
solicitation of campaign contributions.38 Giving money to judges (or
to judges’ election campaigns) creates terrible appearances at the very
least,39 and introduces a powerful corrupting influence. Finally, judges
seeking election (or re-election) may be tempted to make promises (or
issue rulings) that pander to popular sentiment, at the expense of justice
in the individual case.
3.

Establishing a Special Disciplinary Body Within the Judiciary

As already suggested, the best approach to policing and disciplining judges is to keep it inside the judiciary, carried out by a disciplinary
panel or committee composed of fellow judges. This is consistent with
principles of institutional independence, and minimizes the potential for
politicization of the judiciary.
The composition of the body that oversees judicial discipline—or
indeed the body that oversees an independent judiciary—is a matter
of particular concern if judicial independence is to be preserved.40 The
emerging consensus is that judiciaries are best governed by a judicial
council composed mostly of judges.41 The Universal Charter of the Judge
The mechanism to remove him from office—impeachment by the full House of Representatives, and then trial before the U.S. Senate—was sufficiently cumbersome that
it took considerable time to force his removal from office. Mary L. Volcansek, Judicial Impeachment: None Called for Justice 19, 42, 51–63 (1993).
37. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 43,
54–55 (2003).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873, 886 (2009).
It is worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court recently considered a ruling
[in the Caperton case] of the Supreme Court of West Virginia, after a litigant
spent $3 million in campaign contributions to get a more sympathetic justice
onto that court. The campaign was successful, and the newly elected judge
then cast the deciding vote to reverse a $50-million judgment against the
campaign contributor. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the newly elected justice should have recused himself from the case based, if nothing else,
on the problematic perceptions. Nonetheless, it was a close (5-4) decision,
which raises very serious concerns about the integrity of the judicial system
when the judgeships themselves are subject to popular vote.
David Pimentel, Constitutional Concepts for the Rule of Law: A Vision for the
Post-Monarchy Judiciary in Nepal, 9 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 283, 293–94 (2010)
[hereinafter Pimentel, Constitutional Concepts].
40. A more thorough discussion of judicial councils can be found at Pimentel,
Constitutional Concepts, supra note 39, at 294–311.
41. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 103, 104 (2009). In a recent count,
an estimated sixty percent of the world’s judiciaries were governed by such councils,
up from a mere ten percent at the end of the 1970s. Id. at 105. The mere existence of
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provides that “judicial administration and disciplinary action should be
carried out by independent bodies, that include substantial judicial representation.”42 The Palermo Declaration endorses a “Supreme Council of
Magistrates” be “entrusted with the administration and discipline of the
judiciary” in order to guarantee the independence of the judges.43 The
Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary (the
“Beijing Principles”) suggest that such a council “should include representatives [of] the higher Judiciary and the independent legal profession
as a means of ensuring that judicial competence, integrity and independence are maintained.”44 The Council of Europe has recommended that
“[i]n order to safeguard its independence, rules should ensure that, for
a judicial council guarantees little, of course. Judicial councils “may serve more as a
barrier than as an avenue to judicial independence and accountability, particularly in
countries where corruption is systemic or the judiciary is controlled by the executive.”
Violaine Autheman & Sandra Elena, Global Best Practices: Judicial Councils:
Lessons Learned from Europe and Latin America (Keith Henderson ed., 2004).
42. Universal Charter of the Judge, Int’l Ass’n of Judges art. 11 (Nov. 17, 1999),
http://www.iaj-uim.org/universal-charter-of-the-judges/ [https://perma.cc/59AG-L22C].
The Charter has been approved by the member associations of the International Association of Judges and was unanimously approved by the delegates attending the meeting
of the Central Council of the International Association of Judges in Taipei, Taiwan on
November 17, 1999. Id. at pmbl.
43. The Palermo Declaration is a draft additional protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights, articulating a model for the elements of a judiciary
statute, which calls for the creation of a “Supreme Council of Magistrates.” Elements
of a European Statute on the Judiciary: Palermo Declaration, Magistrats Européens
pour la Démocratie et les Libertés [Medel] [European Ass’n of Magistrates for
Democracy and Freedoms] § 3.1 (Jan. 16, 1993), http://www.medelnet.eu/images/stories/docs/Palermo.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3H3-HY7L].
44. Law Ass’n for Asia and the Pac., Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region, AsianLII art. 15, http://www.asianlii.org/asia/other/CCJAPRes/1995/1.html [https://perma.cc/6UH8-ZJNB] (last visited
Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Beijing Principles].
The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary
finds its origins in 1982 in a statement of principles formulated by the Law
Association for Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA) Human Rights Standing
Committee and a small number of Chief Justices and other Judges at a meeting in Tokyo (“the Tokyo Principles”). The decision to formulate the current
Statement was made at the 4th Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the
Pacific in Perth, Western Australia in 1991. . . . [A] first draft . . . was presented to the 5th Conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1993. In light of comments received at that conference and subsequently, and following further
consideration at the conference in Beijing in August 1995, the Statement of
Principles was adopted by the Chief Justices from 20 countries in the Asia
Pacific. A revised version of the Statement . . . was adopted in its final form
at the 7th Conference of the Chief Justices in Manila in August 1997. The
Statement has now been signed and subscribed to by 32 countries in the
Asia Pacific region.
David K. Malcolm, Foreword to Law Ass’n for Asia and the Pac., Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region,
AsianLII, http://www.asianlii.org/asia/other/CCJAPRes/1995/1.html [https://perma.
cc/6UH8-ZJNB] (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
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instance, its members are selected by the judiciary and that the authority
decides itself on its procedural rules.”45 The European Charter on the
Statute for Judges envisages “an authority independent of the executive
and legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are
judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest
representation of the judiciary.”46
Diversified membership can help assure the judicial council’s independence. When lower court judges are represented on the council, and
elected by their peers, those members of the council will have a different
constituency than the Supreme Court judge(s) who may sit beside them
on the council. It may also be advisable for the council to have representation from different geographical regions.47 If the independent legal
profession has representatives on the council, as suggested by the Beijing
Principles,48 they too bring a distinct perspective, and are accountable to
a different constituency. The diverse constituencies served by a diverse
membership on the council is a safeguard against any one person or political institution gaining too much control over the judiciary, and thereby
undermining its independence.
Brazil has taken this approach in a 2004 constitutional amendment.49 Its judicial council now consists of nine judges, two prosecutors,
two lawyers, and two lay persons appointed by the legislature.50
In any case, routine judicial discipline should normally be administered by a judicial body, operating inside the judiciary under the auspices
of an independent judicial council. This provides the best hope of avoiding politicization of judicial accountability, and the consequent threat to
judicial independence.
B.

Accountable for What?

Whoever has the power to discipline judges needs carefully drawn
guidelines for what constitutes grounds for discipline. The threat of discipline will necessarily lurk in the back of the mind of any judge faced with a
controversial or politically-charged case. Could the decision itself prompt
45. Council of Europe, Council Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of Oct. 13, 1994,
principle I, § 2 (c), https://advokat-prnjavorac.com/legislation/Recommendation.pdf.
46. Council of Europe, European Charter on the Statute for Judges § 1.3, July
10, 1998, https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/European-Charter-on-Statute-of-Judges_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LNT-DU3L].
47. In the U.S. federal courts, the governing body of the judiciary, known as
the Judicial Conference of the United States, is composed of approximately half trial
judges and half appellate judges, one of each from all 13 circuits around the country. 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332(a)–(b) (2006). This gives significant representation to lower
court judges and to all geographic regions, each of which may have distinct needs or
concerns.
48. Beijing Principles, supra note 44.
49. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 111 n.35.
50. Id. Brazil’s approach helps diversify the council’s membership, however,
allowing the legislature to appoint two members of the council is inconsistent with
separation of powers principles.
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disciplinary proceedings against the judge? If so, or if the judge perceives it
to be so, the accountability mechanism will deal a serious blow to judicial
independence. Even in the United States, a single decision by a judge may
prompt calls for that judge’s impeachment and removal.51
For this reason, the federal courts of the United States have made
it clear that the merits of a court decision can never be the basis for judicial misconduct proceedings. The controlling statute calls for dismissal
of a misconduct complaint “directly related to the merits of a decision or
procedural ruling.”52 The accompanying Rules for Judicial-Conduct and
Judicial-Disability Proceedings, include in the Comment to Rule 3, the
following explanation:
Rule 3(h)(3)(A) tracks the Act . . . in excluding from the definition of
misconduct allegations “[d]irectly related to the merits of a decision
or procedural ruling.” This exclusion preserves the independence of
judges in the exercise of judicial power by ensuring that the complaint procedure is not used to collaterally attack the substance of a
judge’s ruling.53

The rules and commentary make it clear that anyone unhappy with
the merits of a judge’s decision in their case can seek relief only by way
of the appellate process. But the decision itself, or its merits, is not, and
cannot be, construed in any way as judicial misconduct.54
51. See the discussion of the public reaction to Judge Harold Baer’s controversial decision to suppress evidence in a drug case, including condemnations from
a wide array of powerful public officials, including the White House. John Q. Barrett,
The Voices and Groups that Will Preserve (What We Can Preserve of) Judicial Independence, 12 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 1, 2 n.4 (1996). Members of Congress, who had
the power to remove Judge Baer, openly discussed the possibility of impeachment, id.
at 3 n.6, but in the end, Judge Baer changed his decision and the matter was dropped.
The change of the decision is itself cause for concern, as it suggests that the judge may
have succumbed to this pressure and to these threats.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
53. Judicial Conference of the United States, Rules for Judicial-Conduct
and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (2015).
54. The Rules go on to explain the types of conduct that could be actionable
(would not be deemed “merits-related”) notwithstanding their close association with
the judges’ disposition of the case:
Conversely, an allegation—however unsupported—that a judge conspired
with a prosecutor to make a particular ruling is not merits-related, even
though it “relates” to a ruling in a colloquial sense. Such an allegation attacks
the propriety of conspiring with the prosecutor and goes beyond a challenge
to the correctness—“the merits”—of the ruling itself. An allegation that a
judge ruled against the complainant because the complainant is a member
of a particular racial or ethnic group, or because the judge dislikes the complainant personally, is also not merits-related. Such an allegation attacks the
propriety of arriving at rulings with an illicit or improper motive. Similarly,
an allegation that a judge used an inappropriate term to refer to a class of
people is not merits-related even if the judge used it on the bench or in an
opinion; the correctness of the judge’s rulings is not at stake. An allegation
that a judge treated litigants, attorneys, or others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner while on the bench is also not merits-related.
Id. at 6.
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III. Reconciling/Balancing Independence and
Accountability
Recognizing that there is tension between the concept of judicial
independence and judicial accountability, Thailand must find an appropriate balance in its pursuit of both. What type of judicial structures need
to be in place to ensure that an optimal balance is struck? The issue is a
timely one as Thailand considers adoption of a new constitution.
As I have argued elsewhere,55 the structures that support judicial independence are blunt instruments in pursuing what really matters. Structural
protections for judges, designed to insulate them from outside influence,
serve primarily to bolster their judicial courage to ignore such influences,
but that courage is the important thing. Similarly, judicial accountability
mechanisms are only a surrogate for what really matters: the integrity of
the judges themselves. Structural mechanisms for disciplining judges are
meaningful only if they succeed in inducing ethical behavior among judges,
and/or if they are effective in removing the miscreants from the bench.
A.

Independence and Accountability: Why the Two Concepts Don’t
Actually Conflict
The perceived conflict between independence and accountability is really nothing more than a tension between the means typically
employed to foster each. Surely those approaches need to be balanced.
But the factors that really matter, judicial courage (to act independently,
regardless of the consequences) and judicial integrity (to act ethically,
regardless of whether anyone is watching) are fully compatible and mutually reinforcing. Indeed, it often takes serious courage to act ethically.
While the judiciary can be structured with protections for judges to
encourage independence, and with disciplinary mechanisms to hold them
accountable, the structure is not going to turn bad judges into good ones.
Her performance on the bench may be influenced to some degree by the
judiciary’s constitutional structure, but that performance will be dictated
far more by the judges’ initial endowment of courage and integrity than
by any mechanism for protecting or punishing the judge.
B.

Decisional Independence and Accountability: Finding the Right
Judges

This suggests that judicial selection—getting the right people on the
bench in the first place—may be the most important priority in the effort
to create an independent and accountable judiciary, one that will inspire
confidence and promote the rule of law. Perhaps the focus on the “independence v. accountability balance” is misplaced because what really
matters, what has a far great impact than anything we can do to foster independence or hold judges accountable, is getting the right judges in the
first place: judges with the courage and integrity to do the job right. It also
suggests that judges who lack these qualities don’t belong on the bench.
55. Pimentel, Reframing the Debate, supra note 1.
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Decisional Independence and Accountability: Finding the Right
Structures

As for what balance the structure should strike—how much it should
favor independence protections, and how much it should favor accountability mechanisms—the appropriate balance will be different in every
society, responding to the degree of courage and integrity already demonstrated by that country’s judges. This can be demonstrated graphically.
Because every judge on the bench carries some endowment of courage and integrity, every judge could be plotted on the graph below, with
their placement dictated by those two variables. The area on the graph
can then be roughly divided into four quadrants, with the quadrants on
the right side including those judges with high levels of courage, and with
the quadrants at the top including judges with high levels of integrity.

Figure 1: Plotting Judicial Integrity Against Judicial Courage56

Quadrant A (in Fig. 1) includes our “heroes,” the judges who exhibit both courage and integrity. Quadrant B includes judges with good
intentions, judges who would like to do the right thing, but may be fearful
or easily intimidated. Quadrant C includes judges with neither backbone
nor ethics, easily corrupted. And Quadrant D includes the worst lot of
all: judges with little integrity but with high levels of courage, fearlessly
pursuing their own corrupt agenda. These “monsters” cannot be intimidated (too much courage) and therefore cannot be reformed with threats
of discipline.57
56. Id. Figures 1–3 appeared previously in id. at 28–30.
57. Id.; The Responsible Judge: Readings in Judicial Ethics 35–47 (John
T. Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Winston eds., 1993) (coining the term “monster” for a
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Consider, then, what the impact will be if a stronger accountability
regime is implemented. The judges who can be influenced are likely to
make greater efforts to avoid corruption, as they fear detection and discipline. Figure 2 demonstrates that it will exert upward pressure on the
judges in Quadrants B and C, the ones who can be easily influenced, as
shown in Figure 2. Note that the judges in Quadrant D are unlikely to be
affected; their high level of courage is likely to blunt the impact that fear
of discipline has on their more timid colleagues. High courage judges are
unlikely to be intimidated or influenced; they will follow their own compass without fear of consequences.

Figure 2: The impact of a judicial discipline regime

Consider instead what might happen if a new system of protections
for judges is adopted, a system designed to strengthen their independence by insulating them from consequences for their actions. This will
place rightward pressure on the judges in Quadrants B and C, emboldening them, and allowing them to exercise more courage. The impact is
depicted in Figure 3 below:

thoroughly corrupt judge).
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Figure 3: Impact of strengthened structural protections for judges

This impact is very positive for the judges in Quadrant B, but if the
bulk of the judges in this judiciary have low levels of integrity (and are
in the bottom of the graph), the grant of additional independence will
do more harm than good. It will take corruptible judges and turn them
into monsters.
The upshot of this analysis is to illustrate that independence and
accountability structures have to be balanced in a way that is very specific
to the state of the judiciary in a given society. Bolstered independence
can be a great reform, but only if there is already a high level of integrity
in the system. If the level of courage is high, a strengthened accountability regime may have little impact in terms of reforming the sitting
judges. In such a scenario, the disciplinary regime must focus on actually
removing the “monsters,” because they have little prospect of ever being
rehabilitated into proper and effective judges.
It is not clear where Thailand’s judges are on this graph, to the extent we can generalize about them at all. But there are some indications,
set forth below.

IV. Challenges for Thailand in Particular
A.

Constitutional Transition Presently Underway

Thailand is in a state of transition. Since the National Council for
Peace and Order seized control of the state in May 2014 and revoked the
2007 Constitution the country has been in constitutional crisis. A Constitutional Court continues to exist, and other public entities and offices
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appear to be functioning effectively—remarkably so, given the lack of
a constitutional order at present—but the society is not grounded in a
firm legal foundation. The lack of a foundation in law would presumably
make it more difficult for judges to stand on principle, resisting the pressures that they undoubtedly face. Indeed, without a constitution to set
forth the principles judges should adhere to, judges may have nothing
at all to stand on in their efforts to resist improper influence (from any
source) in their adjudicatory role.
Originally, the military-controlled government had promised a new
constitution almost immediately, and elections by October 2015.58 However, the Constitutional Drafting Committee was unable to complete and
circulate a draft until Spring 2015.59 The draft was widely criticized and
debated, with some going so far as to condemn it as “a step back” that
“deprives people of the rights they earlier enjoyed,” and would “give unlimited power to th[e] government.”60 Whether or not these criticisms
were fair, the National Reform Council nonetheless rejected the draft
135-105 on September 6, 2015, which will result in even greater delays in
the return to democracy.61 Indeed it appears that even if a new charter is
approved in the near future, it will be 2017 before elections can be held.62
In the meantime, the courts are adrift, as they lack defined constitutional powers.63 The government has been criticized for abuse of power
and denial of human rights—it has been accused of claiming “the power
to close down the media, arrest people, [and] order for people to be
shot.”64 Under normal circumstances, the checks and balances of a constitutional democracy would empower the judiciary to rein in any such
abuses of citizens’ human and legal rights. The courts’ practical ability to
do so would depend in large part on its independence from the control
of that government. But without a constitutional basis for the underlying
58. Thai Army Promises Elections in October 2015, BBC News (June 28, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28069578 [https://perma.cc/GZ5K-9WG2].
59. Miles Kupa, Thailand: A New Constitution for a New Kind of Democracy?,
Australian Strategy Pol’y Inst.: The Strategist (May 4, 2015), http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/thailand-a-new-constitution-for-a-new-kind-of-democracy/ [https://perma.
cc/76YA-J236].
60. Doug Bandow, Thailand Suffers as Military Plans to Extend Control: Junta Delivers Oppression, Not Happiness, Forbes (Sept. 1 2015), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/dougbandow/2015/09/01/thailand-suffers-as-military-plans-to-extend-control-junta-delivers-oppression-not-happiness/.
61. Grant Peck & Hrvoje Hranjski, Thailand’s Military-Installed Legislature Rejects Draft of Constitution, Toronto Star (Sept. 6, 2015), http://
www.thestar.com/news/world/20 15/09/06/thailands-military-installed-legislature-votes-down-draft-of-new-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/99ZC-NGJF].
62. Id.
63. Martial law was lifted on April 1, 2015. The law that replaced it did little
to reassure critics that there are any meaningful checks on the power of the military
government now in control of Thailand. Kupa, supra note 59.
64. Editorial, Trickery and False Promises in Thailand, N.Y. Times (April 10,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/opinion/trickery-and-false-promises-inthailand.html?_r=0.
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human rights, the courts may be powerless to assert themselves or otherwise to act independently on such issues.
B.

Perceptions of the Rule of Law

Indeed, it appears that public confidence in the courts has been
declining in recent years. The World Justice Project, which conducts surveys of perceptions of legal systems around the world has documented a
steady decline in both Access to Civil Justice and Effectiveness of Criminal Justice in Thailand over the past five years.65 The cumulative effect of
the decline is significant as, on a scale of 0 to 1.0, Access to Civil Justice
fell by 35%, from 0.60 to 0.39, before rebounding in 2015 to 0.46.66 Even
with that late rebound, which reflects positively on the current government (which seized power in 2014), the overall decline is still almost one
fourth. Criminal justice effectiveness, however, continued its decline at
an unslackened pace after the coup, and has already fallen by 40%, from
0.71 to 0.43 (see Figure 4 below).
To put these numbers in context, Thailand’s 2010 rating among
countries classified as Lower-Middle Income States was, for Civil Justice second only to Colombia and, for Criminal Justice, first. 67 Among
East Asia and Pacific States, Thailand was fifth in both categories, behind
Singapore, South Korea, Australia and Japan (all High Income States).68
Worldwide in 2010, it ranked sixteenth and thirteenth respectively in
those two categories (Civil and Criminal).69 By 2015, Thailand had fallen
dramatically in WJP rankings: in Civil Justice, it fell from second to twenty-sixth in its income group, and from fifth to tenth in its region.70 In Criminal Justice, it fell from first to fifteenth in its income group, and from fifth
to tenth in its region. 71 Worldwide, over the five years from 2010 to 2015,
it fell from sixteenth to seventy-fourth and from thirteenth to fifty-third
respectively in those two categories. 72 Of course, the change in rankings
65. Clearly the blame for this five-year decline cannot be laid solely at the feet
of the military government now in power, which has ruled for less than two years. Indeed, as noted infra, the rating for Access to Civil Justice has rebounded slightly since
the coup.
66. Mark David Agrast et al., World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index
2010, at 88 (2010) [hereinafter Agrast et al., 2010 Rule of Law]; Mark David Agrast
et al., World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2011 (2011); David Agrast et
al., World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2012 - 2013 (2012); World Justice
Project, Rule of Law Index 2014, at 27 (2014); World Justice Project, Rule of Law
Index 2015, at 30 (2015) [hereinafter World Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law].
67. Agrast et al., 2010 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 88.
68. Id. at 100–01.
69. Id. at 119.
70. Agrast et al., 2010 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 88; World Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 145.
71. Agrast et al., 2010 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 88; World Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 145.
72. Agrast et al., 2010 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 88; World Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 145.
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may be misleading, as the decline may represent other countries’ improvement as much as Thailand’s decline. But the change is dramatic.

Figure 4: WJP ratings for the Thai Judiciary 2010–15

Other categories examined by the World Justice Project (WJP) give
mixed messages. WJP’s data reveals that the degree to which criminal
courts are free from improper influence from the government has declined dramatically in the last year, posing a direct threat to the independence of the judiciary. The measure of freedom from improper government influence in criminal courts declined from .52 to .36 (over 30%) in
a single year, while perceptions of corruption also worsened, although
not as dramatically.73 The good news is again on the civil side, where perceptions both on freedom from improper influence, and on corruption
showed a corresponding improvement.74 These changes are illustrated in
Figure 5 below.

73. World Justice Project, 2014 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 185; World
Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 145. WJP’s measure of corruption in the criminal courts also declined 11% from .65 to .58. World Justice Project,
2014 Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 185; World Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law,
supra note 66, at 145.
74. Freedom from corruption increased from .62 to .66, and freedom from improper government influence increased from .35 to .47. World Justice Project, 2014
Rule of Law, supra note 66, at 185; World Justice Project, 2015 Rule of Law, supra
note 66, at 145.
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Figure 5: WJP ratings for the Thai Judiciary 2014–15

The decline in judicial independence that we see on the criminal
side is exactly what we would expect from the uncertain state of affairs,
and the fact the country is going through a constitution-less transition.
The fact that civil justice appears to be improving is surprising, but certainly a cause for hope, that the judges—at least on the civil side—may
be asserting both their integrity and courage, maintaining independence
and the rule of law despite the political upheaval.
C.

Informal Survey Results

Participants in the September 29, 2015, seminar hosted in Bangkok
by the Thailand Institute of Justice, which included over 80 interested
persons, had a chance to weigh in with their own perceptions, using anonymous “clickers.” The results, all of which are reported in Annex A, are a
little hard to interpret—it was not, after all, a representative sample, or a
scientifically controlled survey—but they are worth sharing for what they
do reveal. About half the participants were employed in the public sector
(courts, Office of the Attorney General, Ministry of Justice, and other
government agencies). The remainder of the group included representatives of non-governmental organizations, students, professors, and other
members of the public. The one thing that they all had in common was
sufficient interest in the issue of judicial independence and accountability
to attend the seminar.
Nearly half (49.4%) of the respondents felt that the Thai judiciary
has too much independence, with 41% saying that the courts enjoy an
appropriate level of independence. This is a curious result, given that in
the very next question, 34% indicated that the most serious problem the
Thai judiciary faces is intervention by political forces (19.5%) or other
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special interests (14.6%). Such interference with judicial function is, by
definition, a problem of inadequate independence. But the perception
that there is too much independence is consistent with the response to
a later question showing that about half (51.1%) felt that there was inadequate accountability, “because the Thai judiciary seems untouchable
these days.”75
The “too much independence” response may be explained, perhaps,
by the fact that almost half (48.2%) felt that the judiciary is out of touch
with the people and do not understand how ordinary people feel. This degree of disconnectedness may explain the sense that the judiciary is too
independent. Nonetheless, a majority felt that a good system of accountability would enhance the fairness and neutrality of the judiciary (54%
saying “definitely yes” and 19% agreeing “maybe a little”).76
Few participants saw a serious conflict between judicial independence and accountability, with almost three quarters (73.5%) saying that
it is possible to strike an appropriate balance between the two.
There was general concern among the participants (74.5% of them
highlighting it) that giving judges broad authority to punish contempt of
court may stifle criticism of the courts, and make them less accountable.
Almost all of the participants (93.1%) acknowledged that the Supreme
Court is capable of making mistakes, although it is hard to read too much
into that statistic. It might indicate a lack of confidence in the Court if the
question had not been phrased to emphasize that “nobody is perfect.”
The most serious threats to judicial fairness and efficiency were
identified as (a) lack of moral courage (34%), (b) political power
(26.2%), and (c) money (23%). All of these indicate potential issues with
judicial independence.
Of particular interest is the impact of the legal tradition of issuing
judgments in the name of the king. As rule of law commentators have
long argued, culture and legal traditions play a very large role in establishing the rule of law, in terms of influencing both the behavior of legal
actors and the perceptions of the public.77 Overwhelmingly, respondents
75. See infra Annex A.
76. In the experience of the author, doing judicial reform in various countries
around the world, it is common for people frustrated with an underperforming judiciary to wish for stronger accountability mechanisms to police the judiciary. This
notion is appealing in the abstract, but gets far more complicated when decisions have
to be made about who will be empowered to police the judiciary. As discussed supra,
it is enormously difficult to establish a body that can be trusted with such a task; obviously if that power is wielded by a political strongman, or a politically charged body, or
anyone vulnerable to corruption, the accountability mechanism may accomplish very
little indeed.
77. David Pimentel, Culture and the Rule of Law: Cautions for Constitution-Making, 37 Fordham Int’l L.J. Online 101, 103 (2014) (“[S]cholars of comparative law . . . study how the varying legal systems around the world are shaped by the
legal tradition of each place. A ‘tradition’ runs far deeper than a ‘system,’ of course.
Systems can be changed with simple constitutional, or even legislative, reform. But
a tradition is the product of history, of generations of experience with legal norms
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(87.5%) felt that this tradition has an impact on judicial independence,
with 75% believing it has at least a moderate impact, and 56.3% believing it has “very much” impact. What is not clear from the survey is what
that impact on judicial independence is. At first blush, it can be salutary,
as this couching of a judicial decision invokes royal authority and invokes
the respect afforded by the culture to the king. This could bolster the independence of the judiciary, to rise above petty politics, ignore efforts to
flex political muscle, and act with the dignity that the monarchy bestows
upon its judges. On the other hand, invocation of the name of the king
may foster the perception that the judiciary derives its authority from a
higher power, and is therefore not subject to the checks and balances of
the executive and legislative branches. An overly emboldened judiciary
may become a political player in its own right, overstepping the bounds
normally set for the judicial branch of government, and misusing its independence to pursue a political agenda of its own.
Concerns along these lines were raised in Turkey, where the judiciary was sometimes perceived to be pursuing its own political agenda—
one of extremely strict national secularism—and frustrating the political
branches in their efforts to give greater respect to the free exercise of religion.78 Of course, the judiciary is supposed to be the non-political branch
of government, and because it has no particular constituency other than
Justice herself, it cannot be carrying out any political mandate beyond
that of simply doing justice in the cases that come before it, and enforcing the mandates of the law.79 In the end, the Turkish Constitution was
amended to restructure the judiciary and dismantle the leadership of the
third branch that was pursuing this agenda.80
There is insufficient information to conclude whether the judiciary
is playing such a role in Thailand as well. If so—and the survey responses
suggest that this could be the case—the judicial independence pendulum
may need to swing back a bit, reining in courts and judges who may be
overreaching their role and authority. In such a case, accountability mechanisms may need to be crafted to address such issues, but until there’s a
constitution in place, it is hard to say what the courts’ role and authority
will be, and therefore difficult to find or even define what may constitute
judicial overreaching.
and dispute resolution mechanisms.”) (citations omitted); see also Rachel Kleinfeld,
Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad: Next Generation Reform 98–107 (2012).
78. Mustafa Akyol, The Next Battle for the Turkish Judiciary, Al-Monitor
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-judiciary-battle-gulen-akp.html# [https://perma.cc/H9J3-CT6N].
79. Those in the Turkish judiciary targeted by the constitutional amendments
would insist, of course, that the national secularism (Kemalism) they defended and enforced was called for in the Turkish constitution, and that they were simply enforcing
the law.
80. The government pushed through constitutional amendments in 2010 designed to “democratize” the judiciary, and effect a moderation of the courts’ approach
to enforced secularism. Akyol, supra note 78.
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Conclusion
These are difficult times for the Thai judicial system and the Thai
people. As long as the country is without a constitution, the courts will be
seriously handicapped in playing their critical roles of providing fair and
impartial adjudication, and of protecting human and other legal rights.
Judicial independence and accountability are key issues to be considered
as the Constitution is drafted, to ensure that the Thai judiciary of the
future will be equipped to function effectively.
In considering these issues, it is important to keep in mind that independence and accountability in the judiciary are simply means to an
end, and that the ultimate objective is fair and impartial justice. The most
important factor in producing that is in the character of the judges themselves: the courage they demonstrate in doing justice even when it is unpopular with powerful people, and the integrity that they show to resist
corruption and remain true to core principles. When judges demonstrate
such qualities, they should be supported and protected. And the selection
of new judges should screen candidates for these qualities in particular.
When the constitution is in force, when checks and balances on political power are in place, the stage will be set for a calming of the turmoil
in Thailand. But that can only happen if the judiciary is sufficiently empowered and independent to play that constitutional role while showing
both sufficient integrity to avoid corruption and sufficient restraint not to
overreach into the political realm. In other words, the individual judges
must exhibit both courage and integrity in their rulings. The structure of
the judiciary—the mechanisms for protecting the judges, and for policing
them—will be important in facilitating that result, restoring public confidence in the legal and political system, and ultimately strengthening the
rule of law in the Kingdom of Thailand.

2016]

183

The Case of Thailand

Annex A
Voting Results for the Seminar on Balancing Judicial
Independence and Accountability
Thailand Institute of Justice
Landmark Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand
September 29, 2015
(done with anonymous clickers)
First Session: Voting to explore our seminar participants’ opinions on judicial independence

1. From which organization do you come? (65 votes)
a. Court

20.0%

b. Office of the Attorney General—Public Prosecutor Office, Police,
Department of Special Investigation (DSI)

15.4%

c.

Ministry of Justice

9.2%

d. Other Government Agencies

9.2%

e.

NGOs / Independent Organizations

6.2%

f.

Academic / Professor

6.2%

g. Collegian / Student
h. Normal People
i.

Special People

9.2%
21.5%
3.1%

2. How will you evaluate your level of knowledge about judicial independence and accountability
before the seminar? (79 votes)
a. Very much

3.8%

b. So-so

51.9%

c.

44.3%

Very little

3. What is your opinion on judicial independence in Thailand? (83 votes)
a. The Thai judiciary system has proper independence.

41.0%

b. The Thai judiciary system has too much independence.

49.4%

c.

Thai judiciary system lacks independence.

9.6%

4. In your opinion, which of the following is the greatest concern for the Thai judiciary? (81 votes)
a. Lack of good management

13.4%

b. Lack of public confidence

6.1%

c.

Lack of transparency

d. Lack of external accountability

9.8%
22.0%

e.

Lack of interaction/involvement with the people

11.0%

f.

Intervention by political power

19.5%

g. Intervention by certain kinds of special power/influence
h. There is no problem with the Thai judiciary system. Problems in the
Thai criminal justice system are usually from other state agencies such
as police, public prosecutors, independent entities, etc.

14.6%
3.7%

5. In your opinion, which court is most trusted/reliable? (81 votes)
a. The Court of Justice, which includes the Criminal Court, Civil Court,
District Court, Labor Court, and Juvenile and Family Court

27.2%

b. The Administrative Court

14.8%
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The Constitutional Court

d. Kaifeng Court
e.
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81

Not sure

6.2%
22.2%
29.6%

6. As an ordinary citizen, do you feel you have ownership of your judiciary? In other words, do you
really care if your judiciary system is in good shape or not? (83 votes)
a. I very much care if our Thai judiciary is in good shape because they
have always been the people’s last reliable resource. We believe in them
since we can always depend on them.

28.9%

b. So-so

22.9%

c. No because they have no interaction/involvement with the people.
Therefore, they do not really understand how we feel.

48.2%

d. No comment / I have no interest in Thai judiciary system

0.0%

7. Considering the topic of this seminar, do you think there’s any contradiction between judicial
independence and judicial accountability? (83 votes)
a. Definitely yes, because you could only have one or the other.

2.4%

b. No, I think we can strike the balance between the two.

73.5%

c. Not sure, I don’t know much about judicial independence and
accountability.

24.1%

Second Session: Voting to explore our seminar participants’ opinion on judicial accountability

1. In your perception, what is the present level of judicial accountability in Thailand? (43 votes)
a. Too much accountability; it affects judicial independence.

6.7%

b. Too little judicial inspection; the Thai judicial is seemingly
untouchable now.

51.1%

c.

26.7%

Proper.

d. Not sure.

15.6%

2. You think scope of role of the Thai Judicial Commission is . . . (43 votes)
a. Too broad

12.2%

b. Too little

28.6%

c.

30.6%

Proper

d. Not sure

28.6%

3. Do you agree with the restructuring of the Office of the Judicial Commission by having outsiders
as members of the Commission as well? (55 votes)
a. Agreed

58.0%

b. Not agreed

30.0%

c.

12.0%

Not sure

4. Do you think broad application/interpretation of the offence of contempt of court would cause
any effect to judicial accountability? (55 votes)
a. Not sure
b. No

7.3%
18.2%

81

81. One of the most famous courts in the internationally well-known Chinese
historical literature, Bāo Zhěng. This court is fictitious and has nothing to do with the
real justice system in the modern world, but if a significant number of people vote for
this one there is then an implication on the participants’ perception of Thai courts.
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c. Yes because it may prevent criticism on court ruling that may be
faulty

74.5%

5. Do you think it is possible for the Supreme Court to make a judgement by mistake and not
exactly according to the applicable law? (58 votes)
a. Yes, nobody is perfect
b. No, since all judges are neutral and very good at what they do

93.1%
6.9%

6. Do you think the jury system has any conceptual/ideological linkage to the issue of judicial
accountability? (59 votes)
a. No.

11.9%

b. Yes, directly.

42.4%

c.

32.2%

Somehow yes, but quite indirectly.

d. I don’t know the answer because I don’t know what a jury system is.

13.6%

Third Session: Voting to explore our seminar participants’ opinion on what could be other relevant

crucial factors for the judicial role
1. Which of the following factor you think would affect judicial fairness and neutrality the most? (61
votes)
a. Political power

26.2%

b. Money

23.0%

c.

Certain kinds of special power/influence

d. Public pressure
e.

Lack of judicial moral courage

9.8%
6.6%
34.4%

2. What is your opinion on the judicial role in the past Thai political crisis? (62 votes)
a. They have been involved creatively by helping to find solutions for
society.

11.3%

b. Their involvement might seem biased to some people.

30.6%

c. It must be considered separately on the role of each court whether
it’s Court of Justice, Constitutional Court or Administrative Court

53.2%

d. The judiciary stayed very neutral. It’s actually the society and
politics that tried to involve them.

4.8%

3. When the judiciary has a high level of independence but not enough internal or external
accountability, how would it affect the judicial role and power? (62 votes)
a. Such a situation will yield a negative impact to the judicial role and
power because it opens it to abuse of power and misconduct.

41.9%

b. Such a situation will yield a positive impact to the judicial role and
power because the judiciary will be protected against bad influences.

37.1%

c. There should be no impact because judges normally know how they
should behave and perform their duties according to their morality and
code of conduct.

11.3%

d. Not sure

9.7%

4. Do you think the traditional perception that the Court gives judgements in the name of the King
has any relation to judicial independence in Thailand or not? (64 votes)
a. Yes, very much.

56.3%

b. Yes, moderately.

18.8%

c.

12.5%

Yes, but very little.

d. Not sure.

12.5%
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5. Do you think if Thai judicial system is substantially under checks by external mechanisms and
truly accountable to the people, it would enhance the fairness and neutrality of the judicial power
or not?
a. Definitely yes.

54.0%

b. Maybe just a little.

19.0%

c.

No / I don’t think so.

d. I think Thai judicial system is already fair and neutral.
e.

Not sure.

6.3%
19.0%
1.6%

